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Informational privacy is the ability to determine what others do with your information.1
Small towns are notorious for their lack of informational privacy:
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ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). See also JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL: HOW
WE ARE SACRIFICING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE 3
(2007) (defining privacy “as the exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on oneself”);
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I live in a small town. We have about 11,000 inhabitants. Everyone knows me. We all
know each other. When I ask my neighbour, if my best friend that lives on the other side
of the town has a girlfriend, I will get the answer. However it will not be just a “yes” or
“no” answer - I will get to know everything about her. Her name, age, what her parents
do, her school, every single detail, and that is the disadvantage of our little town.2
Cities offer greater privacy, a fact that impressed the great nineteenth century sociologist, Georg
Simmel. Simmel emphasized that increased privacy meant increased freedom from interference
and censure and hence greater opportunity for the development of a multifaceted self:
whereas earlier [in small communities], individuality was determined primarily by
belonging to a single group, it is now [in large cities] formed by the combination of the
diverse groups to which the person belongs . . . Someone could belong to various
professional associations, at the same time as he belongs to a scientific society, is a
reserve officer, plays a role in a civic association, and in addition has a social life that
brings him into contact with diverse social strata.3
The Internet once looked like the perfect realization of Simmel’s vision of freely developing
multifaceted selves. In the beginning, the Internet made it easy for the like-minded, no matter
what the “like,” to meet with whatever degree of disclosure they desired. The days are gone
when no one knew you were a dog.4 Advances in information processing technology give others
considerable power to collect, analyze, and distribute one’s information, often personally
identifying one in the process.5 We focus on a single consequence: the impact on the self.6

Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STANFORD LAW REV. 1461, 1462 (2000) (“I will use
‘informational privacy’ as shorthand for the ability to control the acquisition or release of information
about oneself”); Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989) (“both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s
control of information concerning his or her person”).
2
Felix Strouhal, PRIVACY IN SMALL TOWNS? NON-EXISTENT (2010), www.bridgeonline.cz/get.php?id=586.
3
Quoted in JERRY Z. MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN WESTERN THOUGHT 248 –
249 (2003).
4
“On the Internet no one knows that you are a dog” is the caption to Peter Steiner’s iconic 1993 New
Yorker cartoon that captured the spirit of the Internet at the time. Peter Steiner, On the Internet, no one
knows your a dog, 69 THE NEW YORKER, 1993, at 61.
5
See, e.g., COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY AND U.S. PIRG, IN THE MATTER OF A
PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT ON PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 15–20 (2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyreportframework/00338-57839.pdf.
2
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We limit our discussion to the private sector, but this is not to ignore governmental
surveillance. “The primary business model of the Internet is built on mass surveillance, and our
government's intelligence-gathering agencies have become addicted to that data. . . The result is
a corporate-government surveillance partnership, one that allows both the government and
corporations to get away with things they couldn't otherwise.”7 Constraining private data
collection is one piece of the solution to constraining the government’s use of data. We further
limit our private sector discussion to businesses and do not address the important fact that
individuals can, and do, easily find out an immense amount of information about each other. This
also can have a profound impact on how you act, as illustrated by one commentator’s question,
What do you do before a first date? . . . [Y]ou may be forgetting the most critical one, the
big G . . . I am suggesting that you spend some time sprucing up your online image (with
as much if not more intensity as your physical image) before truly opening up and letting
someone into your world . . . Google gives people the power to get to know you without
ever actually having to meet you. It’s best to just treat your personal online brand as
though you’re going on countless first dates.8
Our concern is precisely that people may come to think of their words and actions as contributing
to a publicly accessible “brand” that they must keep “spruced up,” and while we limit our
discussion to businesses, much of what we say also applies to individuals.

6

The connection between privacy and the self is a standard theme in the privacy literature. See, e.g.,
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008)(“Theorists have proclaimed the value of privacy
to be protecting intimacy, friendship, individuality, human relationships, autonomy, freedom, selfdevelopment, creativity, independence, imagination, counterculture, eccentricity, thought, democracy,
reputation, and psychological well-being”). The NSA’s surveillance activities have sparked concern about
the self. See Michael P. Lynch, PRIVACY AND THE THREAT TO THE SELF THE NEW YORK TIMES,
OPINONATOR (2013), http://mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/opinionator/2013/06/22/privacy-and-the-threat-tothe-self (“To the extent we risk the loss of privacy we risk, in a very real sense, the loss of our very status
as subjective, autonomous persons”).
7
Bruce Schneier, THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SURVEILLANCE PARTNERSHIP, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (2013),
https://www.schneier.com/essay-436.html. For an illuminating analysis of the modern relation between
democracy and corporate power, see SHELDON SANFORD WOLIN, DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED:
MANAGED DEMOCRACY AND THE SPECTER OF INVERTED TOTALITARIANISM (2010).
8
Slyvia Dziedzic, HOW TO LOSE A DATE IN 10 SEARCH RESULTS (LOOKING GOOD ONLINE FOR A FIRST
DATE), BRAND YOURSELF (2011), http://blog.brandyourself.com/product-tutorials/how-to-lose-a-date-in10-search-results/.
3
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Section I presents the realization of a multifaceted self as an essential ideal and
argues that such selves are realized through social roles that mediate interactions with
others. The successful realization of a multifaceted self requires privacy in public, a
concept the section characterizes. Section II argues that informational norms play a
central role in the creation of privacy in public. Section III provides essential analytical
tools by giving an explicit account of norms. Sections IV and V use those tools to explain
how the rise of the Internet and rapid advances in information processing technology
undermine norm-created privacy in public is crumbling and along with it the privacy in
public essential to the realization of a multifaceted self. Restoring privacy in public
requires restoring and creating appropriate informational norms. Sections VI and VII
considers the prospects for doing so.
In foregoing summary, legal regulation is noteworthy by its absence. Our results
are nonetheless highly relevant to privacy regulation. A critical task for such regulation,
as well as public policy generally, is the creation of appropriate informational norms. One
of our primary motives is to reorient privacy regulation toward that task.

I.

THE SELF AND SOCIAL ROLES
We make three claims. First, the realization of a multifaceted self is an ideal which you

strive to realize. Second, you realize such a self in large part through social roles that mediate
interactions with others. Third, today such realization requires a significant degree of “privacy in
public.” The appeal to “privacy in public” may look like the wilful embrace of a contradiction.9

9

Helen Nissenbaum was, as far as we know, the first to explicitly recognize the importance of privacy in
public for the analysis of legal and policy issues surrounding privacy. See Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an
Approach to Privacy in Public: The Challenges of Information Technology, 7 ETHICS BEHAV. 207
(1997), and Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in
4
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Private and public are opposites, after all: “purely ‘private’ things are completely inaccessible to
others. Purely ‘public’ [things] are completely accessible to others.”10 We begin with an
explanation of privacy in public, and then argue for each of our claims in turn.

A. The Concept of Privacy in Public
Opposition need not mean contradiction; rather, “[p]rivacy and publicity . . . are each
defined with and by each other along [a] conceptual sliding scale.”11 Your degree of
informational privacy—your place on the scale—is a function of how much you can control what
others do with information about you. You can have control in public. A closer the privacy cities
offer shows how. Cities offer privacy by obscurity and privacy by voluntary restraint. Privacy by
obscurity is essentially a matter of getting lost in the crowd, something a city’s physical size and
large population makes relatively easy. As E. B. White famously observed, cities “bestow the
gift of loneliness and the gift of privacy.”12 Simmel likewise extolls privacy by obscurity, but he
also emphasizes privacy by voluntary restraint. He was impressed by the fact that people
voluntarily limit their knowledge of each other as they interact in a wide variety of social roles.
Merchants and customers, students and teachers, restaurant customers and waiters, for example,

Public, 17 LAW PHILOS. 559–596 (1998). These articles introduced us to the concept of privacy in public,
and our approach in terms of norms is also deeply indebted to her work. For later recognitions of privacy
in public, see James H. Patton, Protecting privacy in public? Surveillance technologies and the value of
public places, 2 ETHICS INF. TECHNOL. 181 (2000); Herman T. Tavini, Search Engines, Personal
Information and the Problem of Privacy in Public, 3 INT. REV. INF. ETHICS (2005), http://www.i-r-ie.net/inhalt/003/003_tavani.pdf; and Nick Taylor, State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy, 1
SURVEILL. SOC. (2002), http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1/statesurv.pdf. A 2013 report
from Canada’s Information and Privacy Commissioner emphasizes the importance of privacy in public.
ANN CAVOUKIAN, SURVEILLANCE, THEN AND NOW: SECURING PRIVACY IN PUBLIC SPACES (2013),
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-surveillance.pdf. There is a well-established practice in
sociology of regarding privacy as a existing in public through selective disclosure. See, e.g., CHRISTENA
E. NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY (2010).
10
NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 9 at 4.
11
Id. at 4.
12
E. B WHITE, HERE IS NEW YORK 1 (1999).
5
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typically exchange only the information necessary to their interaction in those roles and
voluntarily refrain from requesting, disclosing, or otherwise discovering more.13
Advances in information processing are eroding privacy in public. This is plain for
privacy by obscurity. A variety of technologies make it increasingly hard to hide: video
surveillance,14 facial recognition software,15 license plate readers,16 and communications
monitoring,17 for example. As privacy by obscurity declines, the need for privacy by voluntary
restraint increases, and we focus on the latter in part for that reason, and in part because the loss
of privacy by obscurity is well-studied already and the erosion of privacy by voluntary restraint
has received far less attention. Unfortunately, technology-driven business practices have already
so greatly reduced privacy by voluntary restraint that
we no longer move about our lives as self-contained beings, but as nodes of information
production in a dense network of digital relations involving other nodes of information
production. All of the data about us as individuals in social network communities is

13

Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies, 11 AM. J. SOCIOL. 441, 468 (1906).
BILGE YESIL, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE POWER AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2009) Some recent
developments are striking. Consider LED-based streetlights with a Wi-Fi connection, broadcast speaker,
audio and video recorders, proximity sensors, and video displays (http://intellistreets.com).
15
See. e.g., Chicago police start using facial-recognition software to arrest suspects,
http://rt.com/usa/chicago-police-cctv-surveillance-135/ (last visited Feb 9, 2014); and Next Generation
Identification, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi/ngi2 (last visited Feb 9,
2014).
16
Vehicle Inspection System, PERCEPTRICS: IMAGING TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS (2014),
http://www.perceptics.com/products/uvis-ig-uvis-sm/vehicle-inspection-system-vis-software.html
(“When security and operating efficiency demand the most robust, easy to use imaging systems, you need
the Vehicle Inspection System (VIS) software. VIS is Perceptics’ proprietary visual database, which
integrates high-resolution images captured by our License Plate Reader, Under Vehicle Inspection
Systems, DriverCam and SceneCam devices into a searchable database. VIS seamlessly ties into back-end
databases so you can capture data, check white lists and make informed decisions.”).
17
Consider the database technology from Palantir. Palantir, PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES,
https://www.palantir.com/ (last visited Feb 9, 2014). It ties “together surveillance video outside a
drugstore with credit-card transactions, cell-phone call records, e-mails, airplane travel records, and Web
search information.” Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, Palantir, the War on Terror’s Secret Weapon,
BUSINESSWEEK: MAGAZINE, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/palantir-the-vanguard-ofcyberterror-security-11222011.html (last visited Feb 9, 2014). Database searches can be combined with
predictive analytics to (attempt to) identify threats before they occur. See, e.g., What is Web Intelligence?,
RECORDED FUTURE, https://www.recordedfuture.com/web-intelligence/ (last visited Feb 9, 2014).
14
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owned, operated, managed, and manipulated by third parties beyond our control, and
those third parties are, typically, private companies.18
We explain how to reclaim privacy in public. Our solution appeals to informational norms, social
norms that constrain the collection, use, and distribution of personal information. 19 The
constraints facilitate the voluntary restraint essential to privacy in public. For convenience, we
will from now on mean by “privacy in public” privacy in public by voluntary restraint, except
where we indicate otherwise.

B. The Ideal of a Multifaceted Self
William James offers a useful initial characterization of the relevant notion of the self. “I
am,” James writes,
often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my . . . selves and
relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat
and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a bon
vivant, and a lady killer, as well as a philosopher, and a philanthropist, statesman,
warrior, and African explorer, as well as a ‘tone poet’ and saint. But the thing is
simply impossible . . . Such characters may at the outset of life be alike possible
to a man. But to make anyone of them actual, the rest must be more or less
suppressed. So the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self must review the list
carefully, and pick out the one on which to stake his salvation.20

18

RONALD J DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: INSIDE THE BATTLE FOR CYBERSPACE ___ (2011).
Simmel’s explanation of privacy in public appeals to directly to the self (“personality” in Simmel’s
terminology). To see how, recall Simmel’s observation that, in certain relationships, “we have to do with
a quite typical boundary, . . . with reference to which . . . the outside party, in observance of conventional
discretion, does obtrude by questions or otherwise.” Simmel, supra note 13 at 454. "Discretion,” he
continues, “is nothing other the sense of justice with respect to the sphere of the intimate contents of life.”
Id. at 454. The “radius of that sphere . . . marks out the distance which a stranger may not cross without
infringing on another’s honor.” Id. at 453. Simmel explains that to “penetrate this circuit by curiosity is a
violation of his personality.” Id. The boundary is really myriad different boundaries defined by different
shared conceptions of role-appropriateness. People respect these boundaries, not (or at least not
primarily) to avoid “infringing another’s honor,” but because they adhere to the relevant norms.
20
WILLIAM JAMES, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 309 (1890).
19

7
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The essential point is that you make yourself who you are by what you “stand by,” by the
commitments you strive to realize.21 One emendation is required.
James contends (at least in this passage22) that one central commitment defines who you
are, but selves consist of multiple commitments. As John Gray notes,
We are none of us defined by membership in a single community or form of
moral life. We are . . . heirs of many distinct, sometimes conflicting, intellectual
and moral traditions. . . . The complexity and contradictions of our cultural
inheritance give to our identities an aspect of complexity and even of plurality
which is . . . essential to them. . . . [T]he power to conceive of ourselves in
different ways, to harbour dissonant projects and perspectives, to inform our
thoughts and lives with divergent categories and concepts, is integral to our
identity as reflective beings.23
The self you seek to realize is a multifaceted self. This conception underlies liberal political
philosophy.24 We place ourselves in this tradition, and assume that the realization of a
multifaceted self is an ideal people strive to realize.

C. Social Roles
It is common to complain that liberal political philosophy assumes that ”selfhood . . . is
transcendent and immaterial"25 and that “one’s self has a nature that is independent of any social

21

There is more than one candidate for the label “concept of the self.” In particular, there are “pure ego”
or “center” theories. See C. D BROAD, THE MIND AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE 558f. (2009), and COLIN
MCGINN, THE CHARACTER OF MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 111f. (2 ed.
1997). For a commitment based theory of the self, see RICHARD WARNER, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND
HAPPINESS: AN ESSAY ON MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (1987).
22
It is not at all clear that James actually thought you had to single out one self. As he notes elsewhere,
“Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry
an image of him in their mind . . . Nothing is commoner than to hear people discriminate between their
different selves of this sort: ‘As a man I pity you, but as an official I must show you no mercy; as a
politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe him;’ etc., etc. ” JAMES, supra note 20 at 295.
23
JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 262 – 263 (1993).
24
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). For an excellent overview, see John Christman,
Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2011 ed. 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/autonomy-moral/ (last visited Feb 16, 2014).
8
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context one may seek its realization.”26 We neither assert nor deny that the self has a
transcendent nature independent of social contexts. We need only the uncontroversial claim that
the roles through which you define yourself are, by and large, social roles, roles provided by the
society—or perhaps better, the societies—in which you live.27
You could not, for example, be a bird-watcher in a society that does not recognize that
role. Try to imagine the opposite. Imagine a primitive tribe whose sole use for animals is to hunt
and eat them; you are the lone anomaly who tracks birds merely to look at them.28 Although you
watch birds, you are not a bird watcher in the sense that a member of the Audubon Society is. To
call yourself a bird watcher in that sense is to ascribe to yourself a recognized role.
Contemporary society not only recognizes that people may enjoy bird-watching, it recognizes
that behavior pattern as an avocation, not as deviant and bizarre. In the primitive tribe, you
cannot refer to an accepted social role to explain your bird gazing to yourself and others. You are
just deviant. Similarly, you cannot be a lawyer except in a society governed by law; practice
medicine unless society recognizes the practice; be a professional race car driver except in a
community that recognizes the sport.29 Even being a parent, child, lover, or spouse takes on
different meanings and definitions depending on the society in which the relationship is realized.
To avoid misunderstanding, we should emphasize that we are not saying that one’s
possibilities or self-realization are completely circumscribed by the social roles one’s society

25

JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY
PRACTICE 16 (2012). We take Cohen to be reacting to “pure ego” theories mentioned in Note 21.
26
Id. at 16. For a response, see, e.g.,WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989).
27
RAZ, supra note 24 at 311(emphasizing the importance of social roles—what he calls “social forms”—
to the development of the self).
28
The example is from Id. at 310.
29
See Id. at 310.
9
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offers. There are clear examples to the contrary.30 Such examples do not, however, undermine
our point that for the most part the roles through which one realizes a multifaceted self are social
roles recognized in the society in which one lives.

D. The Need for Privacy in Public
Realizing multiple social roles requires a significant degree of privacy in public.31
Disapproval and its consequences are perhaps the most obvious reason. Some think that it is
wrong to combine being gay or lesbian with being a parent and seek to prevent it. Exploring
sexuality in sex clubs is, in the eyes of many, unacceptable in a candidate for political office.32
Many parents would have qualms about an exemplary elementary school teacher who at night
drinks himself or herself into oblivion while indulging a passion for (legal) pornography. An
associate in a traditional, conservative law firm might face strong disapproval and even
30

Suppose that you live in a yet to be discovered primitive tribe, isolated from the rest of the world. The
men buy and sell their wives, and women are generally regarded as fungible property. You are the sole
voice for gender equality. While the tribe recognizes other applications of the concept of equality, gender
equality seems ludicrous at best, unintelligible at worst. So, as with the anomalous bird-watcher, neither
you nor your society can understand your gender equality claims with reference to a recognized social
role, at least not the role of “advocate for gender equality.” You, however, can still understand yourself as
committed to gender equality and that commitment can play a central role in your self-definition. You are
just extending your society’s notion of equality into a new area. The bird watcher example may be
different because it may be harder for the bird watcher to find a ready basis for extension in existing
notions of watching and observing.
31
“Because our ability to control who has access to us, and who knows what about us, allows us to
maintain the variety of relationships with other people that we want to have, it is, I think, one of the most
important reasons why we value privacy.” James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHILOS. PUBLIC
AFF. 323, 329 (1975).
32
See Sarah Hall, JERI RYAN SEX-CLUB SCANDAL (2004),
http://www.movies.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,14366,00htm. Jack Ryan’s desire to explore sex with his
famous actress wife Jeri Ryan in a sex club may have been responsible for President Obama’s election to
the US Senate in 2004. Ryan had won the Republican primary for that Senate race and appeared to have a
reasonable chance of defeating Obama in the general election—until the news about the sex club broke.
Ryan was forced to withdraw from the race, and the Republican party of Illinois selected the relatively
unknown Alan Keys to replace Ryan. ByDan CollinsAPJune 25, 2004 & 7:42 Am, SEX SCANDAL ENDS
RYAN SENATE BID, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sex-scandal-ends-ryan-senate-bid/ (last visited Feb
15, 2014). Obama went on to win the general election in a landslide. See WP Politics, November 24,
2004.
10
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termination of employment if the senior partners discovered the associate’s anonymous calls for
radical reform of the legal profession. A thirty-five-year-old man who has lived a law-abiding
and exemplary life as a pediatrician, husband, and parent may face family turmoil and
employment problems when the hospital in which he works and his family learn of his arrest for
possessing an ounce of marijuana at nineteen and his violation of sodomy laws in his one
homosexual relationship at twenty-two. In general, the expectations we create in others when we
are in one role may be deeply disappointed when they find us in what they regard as an
incompatible role. The consequences range from disapproval to ostracism. Disapproval and
reprisal are, however, not the only—nor even perhaps the most important—reasons the
realization of a multifaceted self requires privacy in public. Realizing such a self also requires
that others not know certain things even if their knowing them would have no adverse
consequences. To see why, consider two examples.
For the first, imagine you eat once or twice a week in a small Italian bistro. The waiters
and the owner engage you in brief casual conversation, and you want the interaction to stop
there. You go to the restaurant for a pleasant break from the rest of your life, for an experience as
disconnected as possible from that life. You do not want them to know, for example, that you are
the CEO of an international business. Your concern is not just that the knowledge could change
the way they relate to you and open the door to further questions; you do not want to have even
to think about whether it might do that. You want to play the role of “customer they know very
little about.” You cannot do that if they know too much about you. It does not matter if they
approve, disapprove, or are indifferent. All that matters is what they know.33 This is just one

33

Students of Foucault will point out that the “most sinister thing about surveillance is that, merely to
observe and assess, it must establish standards, which is to say it must arbitrarily assign values of
normalcy to some aspects of human conduct in order to gauge the deviation of others. Watching means
prescribing. As the process extends into each facet of life, everything becomes the object of a totalizing
11
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instance of the general fact that how a person appears to others depends on what those others
know; a person cannot, for example, appear truthful to those who know the person is a liar. The
example also illustrates another important general truth: a person cannot control the way he or
she appears entirely through his or her own efforts. In the restaurant, for example, you need the
waiters’ and owner’s cooperation. They must refrain from finding out about you by asking
probing questions you answer to avoid an uncomfortable situation; looking through the wallet
you inadvertently left behind; using Google, Spokeo, or Lexis/Nexis; hiring private detectives;
or, following you around themselves.
The second example is the student/teacher relationship. Teachers, teachers at large
universities in particular, typically have more or less limited knowledge about their
students. The limited knowledge has important consequences for the way students appear
to teachers. They appear primarily in the light of their relevant academic achievements,
not in light of extracurricular aspects of their personalities, past academic records, honors
conferred or punishments endured. This helps ensure that students are evaluated only on
the basis of relevant academic work. Students similarly have limited knowledge of
teachers. Not only does it help ensure that students evaluate them primarily in terms of
their educational effectiveness, it also allows teachers to model an intellectual or
professional style in an approach to a topic that students can adopt and adapt precisely
because it is not tightly tied to a personal style and history. Students and teachers need
‘gaze,’ a kind of visual tractor beam that bends people to its standards just by looking at them.” Ariel
Ron, AMERICAN PANOPTICON: HOW A SMALL TOWN FORESHADOWED THE SURVEILLANCE STATE, THE
APPENDIX (2013), http://theappendix.net/blog/2013/11/american-panopticon. We do not dispute the
claim. Our point is that merely knowing also has consequences. Sartre makes this point. JEAN PAUL
SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS. 344 (1984) (“If the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the
world as the object that sees what I see, then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must
be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other.”). James Patton quotes
this passage from Sartre in support of his claim that “surveillance . . . changes the experience of being in a
place.” Patton, supra note 9 at 184.
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each other’s cooperation to maintain these limits on what they know; they must
voluntarily refrain from finding out too much about each other.
Similar remarks hold for a wide variety of social roles. Acquaintances, colleagues,
friends, and family, for example, typically can acquire different ranges of information.
Further, different buyer/seller relationships allow and disallow different inquires.
Pharmacists can ask what other drugs you are taking to guard against drug interactions,
but not about whether you are happy in your personal relationships; your internist can ask
about both.34 A washing machine salesperson can ask how frequently you plan to do
laundry, but not whether you text or email more, whereas the opposite is true for an
Apple store salesperson.
In general, selective disclosure is a characteristic of our relationships with others.
As the sociologist Nippert-Eng emphasizes:
At its core, managing privacy is about managing relationships between the self
and others. . . . privacy . . . [is] a "boundary regulatory process by which a person
(or group) makes himself more or less accessible and open to others." When we
regulate our accessibility to others—including the accessibility of information,
objects, space, time, or anything else that we deem private—we simultaneously
regulate our relationships with them.35
She notes that “secrecy is the condition in (and through) which we try to insist that our private
things are as private as we wish them to be. Secrecy is a means to an end, a process in which we
actively work to manage our private matters.”36 She explains that
No matter what the secret, no matter how it is manipulated or what its fate, to consider a
secret is to simultaneously consider the relationships (perhaps entire social networks) that
it throws into relief. Indeed, from a sociological perspective, perhaps the most significant
aspect of secrets is their selectively shared nature. They are secrets with and secrets from,
intentionally disclosed to and concealed from specific individuals at specific times and in
34

At least under some circumstances since your internist has a professional duty to monitor your mental
health to some extent.
35
NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 9 at 22.
36
Id. at 24.
13

Self, Privacy, and Power

specific ways. Simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, secrets are quite effective at
achieving social boundary work, an excellent measure of the social distance between
individuals.37
While we emphasize the place of social roles in determining selective disclosure, Nippert-Eng
takes a much broader view. She is concerned with “the daily activity of trying to deny or grant
varying amounts of access to our private matters to specific people in specific ways,”38 and
social roles are just one aspect of the activity. Nippert-Eng nonetheless provides ample
illustration of the place of roles in creating privacy in public.39

II.

INFORMATIONAL NORMS AND THE CREATION OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
People achieve selective disclosure through interaction in a variety of social roles. It is an

astonishing feat of coordination. How do restaurants, students, teachers, friends, pharmacists,
software sellers, and so on—and indeed on and on—know what the permissible informational
boundaries are? And, how does the coordination happen effortlessly, without thought or explicit
negotiation? Through informational norms.

A. Informational Norms
As Helen Nissenbaum notes, informational norms
circumscribe the type or nature of information about various individuals that, within a
given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed. In medical
contexts, it is appropriate to share details of our physical condition or, more specifically,
the patient shares information about his or her physical condition with the physician but
not vice versa; among friends we may pour over romantic entanglements (our own and
those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial information; with our

37

Id. at 27.
Id. at 2.
39
See, e.g., Id. at chapter 2.
38
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professors, we discuss our own grades; at work, it is appropriate to discuss work-related
goals and the details and quality of performance.40
Informational norms constrain the collection, use, and distribution of information. The
constraints vary as the relevant social roles vary. Accordingly, we focus on informational
norms that take this general form: people shall collect, use, and distribute information
only in ways appropriate to their respective social roles.41 We will refer to these as roleappropriate informational norms.42 It is convenient to give “collection,” “use,” and
“distribution” more precise and restricted meanings than they normally carry. It is
convenient to define “use” first. By “use” we mean taking affirmative action to allocate
different costs and benefits to different individual based on information about them—
setting health care premiums and determining whom to hire, for example. By
“collection,” we mean the acquisition of information that results in merely knowing (or
having an opinion) about people without (yet) taking affirmative steps to allocate costs

40

Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. LAW REV. 119, 120–121 (2004). See
also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF
SOCIAL LIFE (2010); Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DEDALUS 32
(2011).
41
We formulate informational norms differently in ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER,
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: THE CRISIS IN ONLINE PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY (2013). In mass
market seller/consumer contexts, we take them to be of the following form: buyers demand that the seller
collect, use, and distribute information only as is appropriate for that seller’s role. We use “demand’ in the
economist sense of “willing to pay for.” On this treatment, sellers are not parties to the norm. Instead,
mass market norms unify buyers’ demands. We argue that, under conditions that adequately approximate
prefect competition, sellers will conform to norms because that will be the profit maximizing strategy. For
detailed analysis of the role of norms in markets, we prefer the foregoing "consumers only" formulation
of informational norms, but the formulation in the text (which treats businesses as well as buyers as
parties to the norm) is more intuitive and adequate for our purposes here.
42
We introduced the term “role appropriate” in Id., where we discuss the concept at length. “Role
appropriateness” is determined contextually. Over a wide range of cases, group members share a complex
of values that leads them to more or less agree in their particular contextual judgments of appropriateness.
“Within each context, the relevant agents, types of information, and transmissions principles combine to
shape the governing informational norms.” Michael Zimmer, Privacy on Planet Google: Using the
Theory of “Contextual Integrity” to Clarify the Privacy Threats of Google’s Quest for the Perfect Search
Engine, 3 J BUS TECH L 109, 115 (2008). Norms vary from group to group. For simplicity, however, we
take the relevant group to be all United States consumers.
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and benefits. We understand “distribution” to be the further dissemination of previously
collected data.
The examples that follow illustrate the way in which role-appropriate
informational norms create privacy in public. We illustrate collection, use, and
distribution separately, but each example if fully described would exhibit all three. For
the sake of contrast later, we describe the examples against a mid-twentieth century
background. In the 1950s, data collection was in its infancy, with only the beginnings of
credit reporting practices.43 Direct marketing was not widely used until the 1970s.44
People did of course disclose information to businesses, governmental and private
licensing agencies, and so on, but the information was typically stored in geographically
scattered paper records, and there was no convenient way to search all of it. As a result,
in the 1950s people still retained significant control over their information.

B. Collection: Constraints on Merely Knowing
Return to the restaurant example. You have an interest in sharing information in
ways that meet your needs, and the restaurant would like to meet those needs since it
wants your repeat business. How do you and the restaurant coordinate to realize this
shared interest?
Through a role-appropriate informational norm. Within limits, it is role
appropriate for the restaurant to collect (and use and distribute) customers’ personal

43

See RULE, supra note 1 at Chapter III(discussing the history of credit reporting).
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
18 (2004). Prior to 1970, was difficult to differentiate among consumers. In 1970, the change came when
the government began selling census data on magnetic tapes.

44
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information in ways that meet the customers’ restaurant needs.45 The boundaries of
“within limits” and “restaurant needs” are quite indeterminate, but, until relatively
recently, that did not matter much since the customers were the main source of the
restaurant’s information about them, and they could draw the boundaries the way they
wanted.46 Customers and restaurants could coordinate on information processing without
explicit negotiation—indeed, with hardly a thought about it. The restaurant could ask the
number people in a party, provide a menu (in some form), offer non-menu information
about the food, and so on; on the other hand, it would refrain from more pointed inquiries
unless, and only to the extent that, the customer opened the door to such questions (for
example, by answering the pro forma, “How are you tonight?” with, “Just back from
Europe. Have you been there?”). The result was privacy in public: norm-created selective
disclosure that secured the benefits of information processing to the extent that it allowed
it, and that protected privacy to the extent it did not.
Similar remarks hold for the student-teacher relationship and a wide range of
other interactions through social roles. Informational norms facilitated the coordination
essential to privacy in public. The indeterminate boundaries did not matter because
individuals retained considerable control over information about them and so could in
indeterminate areas disclose or conceal as they wished.
45

See John Mariani, WHAT YOUR FAVORITE RESTAURANTS KNOW ABOUT YOU, EAT LIKE A MAN
(2011), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/food-for-men/great-restaurant-service-110811.
46
See Chris Schonberger, THE 20 MOST ANNOYING THINGS SERVERS DO AT RESTAURANTS:
OVERSHARE ABOUT THEIR DAY, THEIR JOB, OR THEIR LIFE BEYOND THE RESTAURANT, FIRST WE
FEAST (2013), http://firstwefeast.com/laugh/the-20-most-annoying-things-servers-do-atrestaurants/s/overshare-about-their-day-their-job-or-their-life-beyond-the-restaurant/ (“Restaurants are
awkward. But we also all know how to play this game, so don’t break the fourth wall and talk about how
you are actually a marine biologist and you’re getting ready to move to Alaska to study whales—or,
worse still, tell a sob story about how another table stiffed you on a tip. Keep it professional, and we
promise to not drag you into our arguments and ask you to arbitrate. The less we know about each other,
the better.”).
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Collection is a case of “merely knowing” (as we are using the term), and the
concern is that what others know about you affects the way you can appear to them.
Controlling what others know is, however, not the only way to control how you appear.
You can control yourself. You will not run the risk of appearing as a lawyer who
advocates radical judicial reform, or as a politician that goes to sex clubs if you do not
call for reform or frequent sex clubs. The use of information—in our sense of “use to
allocate costs and benefits”—can create incentives for one to control what one does and
says.

C. Use: The Allocation of Risks and Benefits
In market economies, private businesses play a significant role in the distribution of costs
and benefits across society. The distribution is a function of the employment opportunities the
businesses provide and the price and type of goods and services they offer. Businesses allocate
employment based on the way people appear to them, and the same is true of goods and services
(different types of consumers may receive different advertising and different prices47). You can
maximize the extent to which the watchers will view your profile with favorable eyes by
controlling what you do, with whom you associate, and what you say.
Employment applications are a good example. Employers and applicants have both
overlapping and opposing interests. Employers want the information that will best enable them to
determine if the applicant is a good fit for the job. Applicants too have an interest in a good fit,
but also have an incentive to withhold unfavorable information as well as to limit even favorable
or neutral information to keep aspects of their lives private from a potential employer. A roleappropriate informational norm coordinates the information exchange. It is role-appropriate for
47

See infra note 57 (discussing price discrimination).
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employers to collect a relevant range of information regarding the suitability of applicants for
employment and use that information in employment decisions.
The references to “a relevant range” and “suitability” introduce considerable
indeterminateness into what the norm prohibits. This is not to deny that there are clear cases. No
one would object to providing references from past employers, providing a resume, and being
interviewed, and, where relevant, providing certifications of expertise. In addition, state and
federal law prohibit a wide range of inquiries, including inquires about race, sex, national origin,
religion, age, or disability, and whether the applicant has children.48 The restrictions are easy to
circumvent, however. Employers can simply ask questions that allow them to infer what they
cannot ask directly—for example, “When did you graduate from high school or from college?”
as a way to infer age,49 and, as long as it is arguably job related, “What is your experience with
such-and-such age group?” as a way to discover if the applicant has children.50 In addition,
employers can ask job applicants to waive privacy rights.51 The upshot is that employers have
considerable latitude in determining what they will regard as information relevant to suitability
for employment.
As in the restaurant example, this indeterminateness did not matter greatly as long as
limited access to data and limited information processing abilities gave applicants considerable

48

See PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, Fourth Edition, BLOOMBERG BNA 230 – 325,
http://www.bna.com/privacy-employment-law-p17179869438/ (last visited Feb 8, 2014).
49
See Alison Doyle, AGE-RELATED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS EMPLOYERS SHOULDN’T ASK, ABOUT.COM,
http://jobsearch.about.com/od/how-to/fl/age-related-interview-questions.htm.
50
See Interview Questions You Can’t Ask and Legal Alternatives, KETTERING UNIVERSITY,
https://kettering.edu/sites/default/files/resource-filedownload/Interview%20Questions%20Not%20to%20Ask_1.pdf.
51
There are limits. Applicants can consent to credit checks under federal law, but state law may prohibit
checks even with employee consent. Use of Credit Information in Employment 2011 Legislation,
December 19, 2011, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/use-of-credit-information-in-employment2011-legis.aspx.
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control over what employers could discover about them.52 A norm-implemented tradeoff was
again the result. Employers were assured a range of relevant information, but norm-imposed
boundaries ensured that they could not reach too far into applicants’ personal lives. The selective
disclosure of privacy in public was again the result. There are many examples, such as: health
insurance,53 direct marketing,54 the extension of credit,55 news reporting,56 and the practice of
price discrimination.57 These differ importantly among themselves, but it is the common pattern
of selective constraint though role-appropriate norms that concerns us.

D. Distribution: The Multiplier
Distribution multiplies the effects of collecting and using data. To see how, think of the
type of information flow collection and use create. It is a simple hub-and-spoke structure. The
hub is a person, and each spoke leads to an entity that collects and possibly uses information
about the person. Distribution complicates this structure. An entity at the end of a spoke can
distribute information to any number of other entities, which may distribute the information to
any number of entities, and so on. The simple hub-and-spoke structure becomes a web of

52

The problem was to constrain employers’ overbroad interpretation of the norm by asking indirect
questions. But well prepared applicants could do so. This is what one should expect with partly
overlapping, party opposed interests—a give and take in which standards develop.
53
See SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41 at 107 - 109.
54
See RULE, supra note 1 at 104; SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41 at 96 – 103; DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 18 (2004).
55
See Priscilla M. Regan, The United States, in JAMES B RULE & GREENLEAF, GLOBAL PRIVACY
PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION 50 (2010).
56
See JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 287 (2008).
57
Price discrimination is charging different buyers different prices for essentially the same product or
service. H. R Varian, Price discrimination, 1 HANDB. IND. ORGAN. 597–654 (1989); It is a longestablished practice that has greatly increased in frequency as the result of technological advances.
Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the Internet, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 355–366 (2003) Price discrimination
requires sorting buyers into groups according to their willingness to pay, and that requires a significant
amount of information. Consequently, sellers structure their interactions so that they can collect and use
the necessary information.
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interconnections. In the mid-twentieth century, the web created by data distribution was not
particularly intricate. This was primarily a function of the available technology, not of normimposed prohibitions.
Role-appropriate informational norms allow the distribution of information to third
parties. It is, for example, role appropriate for teachers to convey relevant information about
students to suitable third parties.58 Students need information about their academic performance
passed on to other institutions and employers, and teachers want to transfer that information so
that their students can secure the benefits they merit. These interests only partially overlap.
Students have an incentive to present themselves as favorably as possible while their teachers
have an incentive to offer a more balanced view to maintain credibility. The norm coordinates
these interests in ways that more or less ensure teachers and students appear to each other in
ways consistent with those roles, including appearances to third parties. Students, for example,
need to know roughly what is in and out of bounds in a recommendation, so they have some
approximate idea of how they will appear to other institutions and employers. The idea is
“approximate” because there is considerable indeterminacy in what the norm permits. It is
typically relevant in a recommendation to mention that the student is highly motivated, and it can
be relevant to describe a key event that illustrates and explains the motivation (“So-and-so is
committed to being a District Attorney because . . .”). But how deeply can a teacher delve into,
or speculate about, the roots of the motivation? It is almost certainly not appropriate to address
intimate details of the student’s family relationships (“In my opinion it is her relationship with

58

Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, STUDENT RECORDS AND CONFIDENTIALITY (2013),
http://sspw.dpi.wi.gov/sspw_srconfid03; Staff and student confidentiality, ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS
AND LECTURERS (2013), https://www.atl.org.uk/help-and-advice/school-and-college/staff-studentconfidentiality.asp; Jonita Davis, TEACHERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES FOR STUDENT CONFIDENTIALITY EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/info_8700551_teachers-responsibilities-student-confidentiality.html.
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her alcoholic mother that . . .”). Just how much a teacher can delve into a student’s psychological
makeup and background in a recommendation letter is a question without a determinate answer.
As with collection and use, the indeterminateness did not matter all that much fifty years
ago. Limited distribution meant that any profile that did make its way into the hands of third
parties did not make its way into all that many hands. Individuals still retained enough control to
selectively disclose information in the ways they wished—more or less. Students could to some
extent ensure that different third parties had different views.
So the result is essentially the same as in the restaurant and employment application
examples. The relatively limited distribution of information made indeterminateness
inconsequential and ensured that individuals retained significant control over information about
them. Norm-implemented tradeoffs secured a range of benefits from distributing information but
protected privacy by imposing distributional constraints and thus created the selective disclosure
required for privacy in public.

E. The Power Shift and the Tradeoff Challenge
This pattern of individual control over data no longer holds. People have lost control over
their information and have done so in ways that undermine privacy in public. The power to
control consumers’ information has shifted to businesses.59 Not only have advances in

59

Richard Posner’s summary is succinct and accurate:
Until quite recently the information that people voluntarily disclosed to vendors, licensing
bureaus, hospitals, public libraries, and so forth, was scattered, fugitive (because the bulkiness of
paper records usually causes them to be discarded as soon as they lose their value to the
enterprise), and searchable only with great difficulty. So although one had voluntarily disclosed
private information on innumerable occasions to sundry recipients, one retained as a practical
matter a great deal of privacy. But with digitization, not only can recorded information be
retained indefinitely at little cost, but also the information held by different merchants, insurers,
and government agencies can readily be pooled, opening the way to assembling all the recorded
information concerning an individual in a single digital file that can easily be retrieved and
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information processing greatly enhanced collection, use, and distribution, but also individuals
have voluntarily placed massive amounts of personal information in the hands of private
businesses.60
Businesses exploit this shift to resolve boundary questions in their favor. This creates a
debased form of norm-governed “coordination” that undermines privacy in public instead of
creating it. In addition, businesses develop novel forms of interaction for which there are no
relevant informational norms at all, and thus a complete absence of the norm-governed
coordination essential to privacy in public. This double loss of coordination is a key event in the
decline of privacy that began in the mid-twentieth century.
The way to restore adequate privacy in public is to create appropriate informational
norms. This involves three tasks. First, since solving a problem requires understanding it, it is
necessary to gain a deeper understanding of how technological advances disrupt norm-created
coordination. Second, implementing new norms means implementing new norm-created
tradeoffs. The tradeoff problem is complex. In the age of Big Data, information processing yields
an increasingly large range of benefits associated with an increasingly broad range of risks.61
Third, it is necessary to develop effective, sufficiently rapid ways to create norms that implement
the tradeoffs. We focus on the first task, understanding the loss of coordination.62 This requires

searched. It should soon be possible—maybe it is already possible—to create comprehensive
electronic dossiers for all Americans, similar to the sort of dossier the FBI compiles when it
conducts background investigations of applicants for sensitive government employment or
investigates criminal suspects. The difference is that the digitized dossier that I am imagining
would be continuously updated.
Richard Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 245, 248 (2008).
60
See DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS REASONING ABOUT A
HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 347 (2010).
61
See Robert H Sloan & Richard Warner, Big Data and the “New” Privacy Tradeoff, BIG DATA PRIV.
WORKSHOP PROC. (2013), http://www.futureofprivacy.org/big-data-privacy-workshop-paper-collection.
62
We have addressed the second and third tasks elsewhere. SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41.
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an explicit analysis of norms. We begin with a definition of norms in general and then turn
specifically to coordination norms.

III.

NORMS AND COORDINATION
We define norms in terms of nearly complete conformity.63 A norm is a behavioral

regularity in a group, where the regularity exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks
that he ought to conform to the regularity.64 We leave open the question of how many must
conform for almost everyone in a particular group to conform, as well as the question of how to
define the group within which conformity occurs (“almost everyone” means “almost everyone in
such-and-such group”). For example, in Jones’s small town, the norm is to go to the Protestant
church on Sunday: everyone goes to a Protestant church on Sunday, and they do so at least in
part because each believes he or she ought to.

63

We discuss norms in detail in Id.
Our notion of a norm is a standard one in recent law and economics literature, with one exception. We
explain conformity to the norm by appeal to people’s beliefs above what they ought to do. The recent
literature in contrast explains conformity as the result of self-interested actors avoiding the costs of
nonconformity. “[One] approach typically assumes that people care only about their own (material) well
being, and rely on repeated game models to explain how they cooperate or refrain from violating social
norms. . . . [A] second approach typically assumes that people care about something else aside from
material goods—esteem, or status, or conformity, or some such thing.” Eric A. Posner, Introduction to
SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW xi-xii (Eric A. Posner ed., 2007). Richard
McAdams, a proponent of the second approach, notes that “by norm I mean a decentralized behavioral
standard that individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow . . . [to gain the esteem of
others], or because the obligation is internalized, or both.” Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, in SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW 101,
144 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2007). The emphasis on “feeling obligated” would appear close to our view that
people conform because they think they ought to; however, McAdams explains “feeling obligated” in
terms of the costs of non-conformity—thus: “Without internalization, one obeys the norm to avoid
external sanctions. . . . After internalization, there is yet another cost to violating a norm: guilt. The
individual feels psychological discomfort whether or not others detect her violation.” Id. McAdams still
conceives of people as self-interested agents seeking to avoid costs they regard as unacceptable. We take
it to be clear that people are not merely self-interested agents. The assumption that they are has been
extensively and decisively criticized. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 32-33 (2009).
64
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A. Coordination Norms
Like norms generally, a coordination norm is a behavioral regularity in a group to which
people conform because they think they ought to do so. The difference is that people think they
ought to conform because, and only as long as, they think almost everyone else will. This is not
true of the church example: people could and would attend church even if others did not. Driving
on the right is the classic example of a coordination norm. People drive on the right because, and
only as long as, almost everyone else does so.65 You would not drive on the right if you expected
everybody else to drive on the left. Safety and convenience dictate that you drive on the same
side as everyone else, and you need to coordinate with the others’ cooperation to do that. Thus
our definition of a coordination norm: a coordination norm is a behavioral regularity in a group,
where the regularity exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks that, in order to realize
a shared interest, she ought to conform to the regularity, as long as everyone else does.66
Entering an elevator occupied by others is a good example. The norm is to maximize the distance
to your nearest neighbor.67 All share an interest in being able to use the elevator and avoiding
overcrowding, and no one can realize the interest unilaterally. Elevator users think they ought to
conform to achieve this balance—as long as everyone else does so. There is little point in being a
“nearest-neighbor distance maximizer” if everyone else just stands wherever they like.

65

H. Peyton Young, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 105, 107–108 (1996) (providing a game-theoretic explanation
of the decision made by individual drivers as to whether to drive on the right or left side of the road).
66
See SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41 at 56 – 59.
67
This is a simplification. The true norm is closer to “maximize the distance from your nearest neighbor
subject to the constraint that you stay within the peripheral vision of at least one other passenger, and that
you have at least one other passenger within your peripheral vision.” See Matthew Solle, WHERE WE
STAND IN AN ELEVATOR, YOU THE USER (2012), http://www.youtheuser.com/2012/04/26/where-westand-in-an-elevator/ (last visited Feb 9, 2014).
25

Self, Privacy, and Power

The informational norms that facilitate the coordination essential to privacy in public are
coordination norms.68 People coordinate to create privacy in public in just the way they
coordinate driving on the right—through a coordination norm. The examples in the last section
exhibit the key features of coordination norms. There is a shared interest (meeting needs, fitting
with the job, presenting a balanced view of a student’s performance). In addition, the parties
conform to the prevailing interpretation of the norm only as long as they think the other parties
will conform. If, for example, most customers insisted that restaurants provide them with a
detailed questionnaire about their food preferences every time they went to a restaurant,
restaurants would comply to get the business and the remaining minority of customers would
most likely continue to patronize survey-supplying restaurants to get the food. Similarly, if most
job applicants or students preferred employers and schools that accepted the applicants’ or
students’ recent Myers-Briggs personality test results, employers and schools would accept the
results.69

B. Value-Optimality and Privacy in Public
A cornerstone of our account is the notion of a value-optimal norm. Only value-optimal
norms create adequate privacy in public. Technology-driven business practices undermine
privacy in public by creating situations that are not governed by value-optimal norms—either by
causing existing norms to cease to be value-optimal, or by creating situations for which there are
no relevant norms and so no value-optimal ones. We begin by defining value-optimality.
68

Not all informational norms are coordination norms. “Make your comments relevant” is an
informational norm, but not a coordination norm. The hallmark of a coordination norm is that you adhere
to it only as long as others do, but you would adhere to the relevant comment norm even if most others
did not.
69
For a fuller argument, see SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41, which discusses similar examples of
changes in consumers’ demands. The discussion proceeds in terms of the “consumers only” formulation
of norms explained supra note 41, a formulation which proves advantageous in this context.
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A norm is value-optimal when, in light of the values of all (or almost all) members of the
group in which the norm obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any alternative.70 A
norm that is at least as well justified as any alternative is either better justified than any
alternative or is tied with one or more alternatives that are also better than the rest. This is why it
is appropriate to call a norm value-optimal when it is at least as well justified as any alternative
norm: there is no better alternative.71
We will focus primarily on norms that are not value-optimal. A classic example is the “no
helmet” norm among National Hockey League players.72 Before 1979, not wearing a helmet was
a behavioral regularity that existed in part because each player thought he ought to conform—as
long as all the others did. Wearing a helmet meant not looking tough, and involved a slight loss
in peripheral vision. However, each player would have happily worn a helmet if he thought
almost all the others were going to. Because of the value they placed on avoiding head injuries,
virtually all the players regarded the alternative in which they all wore helmets as better justified.
Thus, the no-helmet norm was not value-optimal. But the players remained trapped in it because
no individual player would wear a helmet as long as he expected most others not to.73
Consumers “play privacy without a helmet” when informational norms cease to be valueoptimal. Lack of value-optimality means: either too much privacy and too little information
70

To avoid misunderstanding, we should note that we are not, for example, saying that when you step into
an elevator, you explicitly think about where you ought to stand. Typically, people just unreflectively
conform to the norm. The point is that you could justify conformity if you reflected on the norm under
ideal conditions (including having sufficient time, sufficient information, lack of bias, and so on).
71
There are many optimality notions; Pareto optimality is perhaps the most well-known. A situation is
Pareto-optimal when, and only when, it is not possible to improve the well-being of any one person
without making others worse off. Value-optimality is an ideal that we approximate in practice. We want
our norms to be close enough to being value-optimal. We will throughout for convenience drop the
“close enough to being” qualification and just refer to norms as value-optimal or not.
72
We have discussed the example before in SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41 at 61 – 62; The original
source is T. C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary
Choices With Externalities, 17 J. CONFL. RESOLUT. 381 (1973).
73
See Schelling, supra note 72 at 381.
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processing; or, too little privacy and too much information processing. Technology-driven
business information processing practices pass significant control over consumers’ information
to businesses in ways that create an extreme case of too little privacy and too much information
processing, and consumers remain trapped in a norm that, contrary to their values, undermines
rather than creates privacy in public. This debased “coordination” combines with a total lack of
relevant norm implemented coordination in those cases in which innovative practices have
outstripped the relatively slow pace of the formation of norms. The combination significantly
erodes privacy in public, and, to the extent it disappears, multifaceted selves face the threat of
disappearing—literally—from the scene.
In both cases, the solution is to create new norms, and that means identifying valueoptimal tradeoffs between informational privacy and the benefits of information processing. One
problem is that value-optimal tradeoffs are not always already contained in our values just
waiting for us to think long enough and hard enough to find them. Defining value-optimal
tradeoffs is not like looking for buried treasure. The treasure is there whether you find it or not,
but in creating new norms it will often be necessary to invent the tradeoffs. The reason is that
values are not closed, complete, consistent systems that guide you through all decisions you must
make. Instead, they are often more or less detailed outlines that leave large areas barely filled in,
and they may incorporate competing, or outright inconsistent, claims and views, whose weight is
not fixed in advance of reasoning about particular situations.
We focus first on existing norms that have lost value-optimality and then turn to the cases
of a complete lack of relevant norms.

IV.

THE EROSION OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC: THE LOSS OF VALUE-OPTIMALITY
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Businesses transform value-optimal norms into ones that are not through technologydriven businesses practices that occupy the norm’s indeterminate areas. We describe three
examples—one each for collection, use, and distribution.

A. Collection: Anybody Can Know About Anybody
Imagine a mythical small town in which everyone really does know everyone in great
detail. Information technology has not even come close to creating a small town in this sense.
Most of the 316 million people in the United States74 know nothing about the vast majority of
those millions. It takes time, effort, and money to collect and use information in that way, and
only those who see the payoff as greater than the effort will select some people to investigate.
Information technology and the Internet ensure that almost anybody can find out a great deal
about almost anybody. And people do—for example: journalists, skip tracers, people going on
dates, email providers, politicians, security experts, bankers, lawyers, and jury analysts.
The restaurant example is a good illustration of the effect of merely knowing.75 The
journalist Jason Heidemann describes his recent visit to Goosefoot,
chef Chris Nugent's ballyhooed restaurant in Lincoln Square . . . I'd barely sat down when
[co-owner and host Nina] began making informed references about me—specifically my
job. I recall her asking how long I'd been there and what projects was I working on.
When I pressed her, she confessed she had Googled me in advance of my visit. At
Chicago's best restaurants, this has become increasingly common.76
Google is far from the only source of information restaurants now have. The online reservation
service Open Table, for example, allows “sommeliers and maitre d’s [to] use the system to easily
74

United States Census Bureau, U. S. AND WORLD POPULATION CLOCK,
http://www.census.gov/popclock.
75
You might consider the restaurant example to instead illustrate the combined effect of knowing and
using. However, our point is that once one merely knows, certain use becomes more or less automatic,
requiring no additional effort.
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Jason A. Heidemann, YOU’VE BEEN GOOGLED — BON APPETIT!, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (2013),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20130629/ISSUE03/306299997/#.
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catalog diners’ habits and quirks, resulting in a vast database of customer information.”77 Other
data aggregation and analysis services for restaurants abound.78 Is it role appropriate for
restaurants to acquire such data? The indeterminateness in the norm-drawn boundaries means
that there is no clear answer. Businesses practices move into the indeterminate area. This gives
rise to the four-part pattern, we describe below. Similar patterns characterize the use and
distribution examples we examine later, and we suggest the pattern is characteristic of cases in
which norms cease to be value-optimal.
(1) Businesses treat the practice as role appropriate. Restaurants defend their data
collection as simply a better way to do what they have always done, meet customers’ needs. One
commentator notes that “[f]or many restaurateurs, today’s detailed dossiers are merely a modern
spin on the old fashioned, high-touch service associated with legendary hosts such as Niccolini
and Sirio Maccioni, who’s been running Midtown’s storied Le Cirque restaurant since 1974.”79
As one restaurateur put it, “There’s a fine line, but as long as you don’t cross it, people just think
you’re good at your job.”80 Such attitudes should come as no surprise. As James Rule notes,
Aware of it or not, we are all heirs to potent Enlightenment ideas in matters relating to
control. If knowledge is good, and informed action preferable to the alternative, why
shouldn't we expect institutions of all kinds to maximize their grip on the lives of those
they deal with? If government and private organizations are pursuing what are publicly
recognized as legitimate ends, why shouldn't they do so as efficiently as possible?81
The theme that “knowledge is good, and informed action preferable to the alternative” runs
through the next two examples as well.

77

Carla Spartos, Is your restaurant spying on you?, NEW YORK POST, December 22, 2010,
http://nypost.com/2010/12/22/is-your-restaurant-spying-on-you/.
78
See Stephanie Miles, 6 TOOLS RESTAURANTS CAN USE FOR BETTER GUEST INTELLIGENCE,
STREETFIGHT (2103), http://streetfightmag.com/2013/07/22/6-tools-restaurants-can-use-for-better-guestintelligence/.
79
Spartos, supra note 77.
80
Id.
81
RULE, supra note 1 at 192.
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(2) Consumers object to the invasion of privacy. The “fine line” comment reveals the
problem. The lines norms draw are not fine but indeterminate; moreover, it is no longer the
customer who decides what tradeoffs occur in those indeterminate regions, it is the restaurant.
This deprives customers of control that they had until recently over how they appear. Some
customers might be quite willing to trade some control for restaurants being better able to meet
their needs, but even those customers have no control over the tradeoff, the restaurants do. This
loss of control is a loss of informational privacy, and customers object to the loss. When
Heidemann “posted a note about the trend [of restaurants Googling customers] on . . . a message
board for Chicago foodies,” the responses ranged from “That's just odd” to “I would like to know
which restaurants research their clientele, so I make sure I never go there.”82 The objections are
hardly a surprise. Over twenty years of studies and surveys show that consumers want more
control over their data than current business information processing practices provide.83 In
addition, it is the restaurants making tradeoff decisions about privacy for their customers, and
those decisions are bound to provoke objections. As James Rule notes,
[M]any people seem to identify the point at which routine claims on personal information
cross the line into intolerable privacy invasion in much the same way most people
classify pornography: they know it when they see it. But as with pornography, reasonable
people often disagree on where to draw the line. One man's shameless exploitation of sex
82

Heidemann, supra note 76.
Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and rationality in individual decision making, 3 IEEE
SECUR. PRIV. 26–33, 28 (2005) A typical study found that 89% of consumers had either a “high concern”
(53.7%) or a “medium concern” (35.5%) about “general privacy.” Of course, finding that consumers are
“concerned” does not mean that they are concerned about loss of control over their information, but why
else would they be concerned? The worry is surely that others will do something unacceptable, so
consumers must be concerned about some combination of the intertwined issues of trust and control. It
would indeed be strange if this were not true. In general, control and trustworthiness are important
considerations in determining whether to enter or continue a relationship; we may, for example, refuse to
work with, go on a trip with, or associate with someone because he or she is too controlling or too
untrustworthy. Studies of consumer attitudes toward direct marketing confirm this conclusion. One recent
study found that, when consumers are informed about current direct marketing information processing
practices, between 73% and 86% find such practices objectionable. JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS
REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT (2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214.
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for profit may turn out to be the next woman's harmless erotica, or even serious art or
literature for a third consumer. 84
(3) Consumers nevertheless continue to conform to the reinterpreted norm. Customers
continue to go to restaurants that engage in intensive data collection. This may provoke the
response, “Of course, because most do not understand what the restaurants are doing.” But, even
if they did understand, many would still patronize data-collecting restaurants. Privacy is only one
factor in a choice of a restaurant. The quality and type of food, the service, ambience, price, and
location matter a great deal, and people are remarkably ready to trade privacy for other
benefits.85 Lack of choice is another reason. An ever increasing number of restaurants collect
data about their customers.86 Competition among restaurants is fierce, and many restaurateurs
believe that intensive data collection gives them a competitive edge.87 It takes time and effort to
investigate a restaurant’s information processing practices, and we “give up data about ourselves
because we don’t have the time, patience, or single-mindedness about privacy that would be
required to live our daily lives in another way.”88

84

RULE, supra note 1 at 146.
While a large number of studies show that consumers are concerned about losing control over personal
information, “a number of . . . recent surveys, anecdotic evidence, and experiments . . . have . . . shown
that individuals are actually less concerned about privacy than what they claim to be: many are willing to
provide very personal information, in exchange for small rewards.” Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy and
Security of Personal Information, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 179–186 (J. Camp & R.
Lewis eds., 2004). This may seem inconsistent with the concern noted supra note 83 to have more control
over information. We think the inconsistency is only apparent. We explain the willingness to “trade
cheaply” as just the behavior to be expected from people trapped in an informational norm that is not
value-optimal. SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41, at 101 - 102.
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See Your favorite restaurant could be stalking you, EXAMINER.COM (2012),
http://www.examiner.com/article/your-favorite-restaurant-could-be-stalking-you (last visited Feb 9,
2014); Mariani, supra note 45.
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(4) The norm is not value-optimal. The norm is not value-optimal if there is a better
justified alternative, and consumers think there is—one with a more restrictive interpretation of
role-appropriate data collection that gives them more control over their information. There is
excellent empirical and theoretical reason to think this is true. The empirical reason consists of
the over twenty years of studies that show that consumers desire more control over their data.89
The theoretical reason is that an adequate degree of privacy in public is essential to the
realization of a multifaceted self. Ensuring that conditions allow you to be who you are is
certainly an excellent reason for the concern with control.

B. Allocation of Risks and Benefits
Modern data collection and analysis greatly increases the power of private businesses to
determine the distribution of goods, services, and employment. The concern is not that private
businesses have the power to distribute such benefits. Their having some degree of power to do
so is a defining feature of a market economy. The concern is that the power is now too great.
One problem is that the resulting distributions of costs and benefits are sometimes unjust, as we
have argued elsewhere.90 Here we focus on the effect on multifaceted selves. Enhancing the
power to make fine-grained distinctions in the distribution of costs and benefits increases the
incentive to make sure you stay in the straightjacket of exhibiting the characteristics businesses
reward.
Employment background checks are a good example. Job applicants are only one source
of information for employers. HireRight and Lexis/Nexis, for example, offer to search county,
state and federal criminal records, national criminal database records, international criminal
89
90

Acquisti, supra note 85.
SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41.
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records, civil court records, the national theft database, drug and alcohol databases, motor
vehicle records, and ex offender registries. Its services also include verifying Social Security
Numbers, employment, education, professional licenses, professional credentials verification; it
will also provide professional reference checks and credit reports.91 “Screening often goes far
beyond the familiar checking of public criminal records. For $60 to $80 per applicant,
ChoicePoint [now Lexis/Nexis] and its rivals assemble digital dossiers of educational degrees
and credit histories as well as interviews with friends, past bosses, and colleagues.”92 Employers
can discover additional information on their own by Googling applicants, visiting their social
networking sites, or using sites like PeekYou93 and Spokeo.94 Does this degree of penetration
into people’s personal lives violate a role-appropriate informational norm? It is, within limits,
role appropriate for an employer to collect and use information that will help determine how well
a job applicant will fit the needs of the business. The limits are sufficiently indeterminate that
employers can with some plausibility claim that intensive background checks are role
appropriate. The pattern that arises is the same as in the restaurant example.
(1) Businesses treat the practice as role appropriate. Businesses sound the “knowledge is
good, and informed action preferable to the alternative” theme and treat background checks as
just an improvement on the well-established practice of determining how well an applicant will
fit with the job. One recent defense of background checks argues that “background checks help
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See Background Screening, HIRERIGHT, http://www.hireright.com/Background-Checks.aspx?apsi=0.
http://www.lexisnexis.com/backgroundchecks.
92
Chad Terhune, THE TROUBLE WITH BACKGROUND CHECKS BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK MAGAZINE
(2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-05-28/the-trouble-with-background-checks.
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http://www.peekyou.com/usa. See Bob Rankin, IS PEEK YOU EVIL? ASK BOB RANKIN,
http://askbobrankin.com/is_peekyou_evil.html. (links may include social networking profiles).
94
www.spokeo.com. See Justin Brookman, COMPLAINT TO THE FTC IN THE MATTER OF SPOKEO CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, https://www.cdt.org/comments/complaint-ftc-matter-spokeo
(“profiles include highly personal information, including religious and ethnic background, judgments
about shopping and recreational habits, and information about family members and roommates”).
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employers make better hiring decisions. With screening, we can learn about the past behaviors
and experiences of an individual in order to make informed predictions about how well an
employee will perform inside our organization.”95 Similarly, the City of Bozeman, Montana
defended its practice of requiring social networking site passwords from applicants by insisting
that
“[b]efore we offer people employment in a public trust position, we have a responsibility
to do a thorough background check . . . Shame on us if there was information out there
available about a person who applied for a job who was a child molester or had some sort
of information out there on the Internet that kind of showed those propensities and we
didn't look for it, we didn't ask, and we hired that person."96
There are many similar examples.
(2) Applicants object to the invasion of privacy. Pre-employment background checks
have caused a storm of protest.97 The Bozeman city’s defense of insisting on social networking
passwords, for example, “wasn't good enough for many critics, who cited the move as an
invasion of privacy. After the story was covered in the local news, residents sent hordes of letters
and e-mails to city hall, eventually forcing officials to back down and discontinue the practice.”98
(3) Applicants nonetheless continue to conform to the norm under employers’ new
interpretation of role appropriateness. Employer use of background checks is widespread, so not
complying with employer background checks would mean not applying for employment in a
significant range of cases.
95

Evan Carmichael, WHERE DO YOU STAND ON EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND CHECKS?, BELIEVE,
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(4) The norm so interpreted is not value-optimal. There is a better justified alternative.
The reason is the same as in the restaurant example: empirical studies establish people’s desire
for more control over their information and, moreover, that control is essential to realizing a
multifaceted self. In this case, however, there is an additional reason: namely, to create a better
distribution of employment than the one created by the current use of pre-employment
background checks. A better distribution is called for because the current distribution strongly
discriminates against “undesirable” applicants—applicants that impose significant risk or cost on
the employer. Imagine, for example, that Alice is a single mother whose three-year old child has
a severe chronic illness requiring long-term expensive treatment. Alice will potentially increase
an employer’s health care costs and will have a greater than normal number of absences from
work. She is, in this sense, an “undesirable” hire. This is inconsistent with (most) people’s
values. One reason, and the one most pertinent here, is that the practice works against the
realization of multifaceted selves by creating a very strong incentive to make sure that the shape
of your life takes is one employers find desirable, not one that reflects who you are. This is the
twenty-first century version of the high school teacher’s threat, “This will go on your permanent
record.” As one blogger notes, “Every classroom contains a few kids who are bored and like to
cause trouble. When I was in school, our teachers would threaten them by saying, ‘This will go
on your permanent record!’ The threat was effective: none of us wanted to be prevented from
going to college or from getting a job.”99
In short, the second reason the new norm for hiring practices is not value-optimal is that
the resulting distribution of jobs is unjust. At least, we think so, and we assume many if not most
99

See Mike Pilewski, SURPRISE! YOUR BEHAVIOR IS ON RECORD (2010), http://www.spotlightonline.de/blogs/mike-pilewski/surprise-your-behavior-is-on-record (emphasis added). See also Peter
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agree. We assume that at least some types of “undesirable” hires ought to be employed, and
hence that a just distribution of employment requires a distribution of those “undesirable”
employees over employers in a way that reasonably spreads the increased costs and risks over
employers as a whole. This more or less happened in the mid-twentieth century. It was difficult
for employers to discover, for example, that Alice was a single mother with a sick child if she did
not disclose that, and the same was true for a wide range of other “undesirable” traits. The result
was in effect a lottery: the luck of the draw distributed employees with “undesirable” traits over
employers as a whole. Now, to continue with Alice, information aggregators may easily pick up
her Internet activities (visits to health care sites, support forums, Facebook postings, and the like)
and flag her as a risk for significant work absences and high health care costs. Swap the sick
child for a criminal record, a bad credit history, being a recovering alcoholic, having had an
episode of depression requiring prescription drugs, or any other trait some employer finds
objectionable. The result is a profound—and unjust—change in the distribution of
employment.100

100

See Beth Givens, PUBLIC RECORDS ON THE INTERNET: THE PRIVACY DILEMMA, PRIVACY RIGHTS
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Similar remarks apply to health insurance,101 the extension of credit,102 direct
marketing,103 price discrimination,104 and news reporting.105 We acknowledge—indeed
emphasize—that there are significant differences among the examples. Each merits and
requires detailed examination on its own; in particular, the analysis of the loss of valueoptimality will vary considerably in each case and this means that the task of creating
relevant value-optimal norms differs in each case.

C. Distribution
Distribution multiples collection and use by turning the simple hub-and-spoke structure
created by an initial instance of data collection into a web of interconnections. The combination
of modern information processing techniques and the Internet mean that distribution now creates
vastly more interconnections than it did in the past. For example, one of us recently visited the
chess website, chess.com. The site collects information for its purposes and also serves as a
conduit for the transfer of information to third parties. The visit produced the following
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See SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 41 at 107 – 109.
See James Rule’s discussion of the greatly enhanced ability of creditors to determine whether their
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pattern.106 The triangles are third party sites collecting, using, and distributing information;
chess.com is the circle with the pawn, and the other circles are previously visited sites:

This picture is just a partial representation of the actual structure. A more detailed
ed picture would
also show transfers from the third parties to others that will also collect, use, and distribute the
information to others (who may distri
distribute it to others, and so on). The complexity is immense:
The technical and institutional story is so complicated that probably only a handful of
deep experts would be able to piece together a full account . . . Even if, for a given
moment, a snapshot of the information flows could be grasped, the realm is in constant
flux, with new firms entering the picture, new analytics, and new back
back-end
end contracts
forged: in other words, we are dealing with a recursive capacity that is indefinitely
indefinitel
extensible.107
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Each point becomes a collection and (potential) use point: distribution multiplies collection and
use by the number of points in the distribution network. The following map of the distribution of
health care information illustrates the point.108 Solid arrows indicate the transmission of your
name; dotted arrows, no name:

Multiplying use and distribution multiplies the loss of value-optimality. Google,
OpenTable, HireRight, and Lexis/Nexis (and a host of others) spread the availability of data
across any number of restaurants and employers, for instance, and thereby further undermine
Approach to Privacy Online, supra note 43 at 35 – 36. See also CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, IN
THE MATTER OF REAL-TIME TARGETING AND AUCTIONING, DATA PROFILING OPTIMIZATION, AND
ECONOMIC LOSS TO CONSUMERS AND PRIVACY (2010),
http://www.centerfordigitaldemocracy.org/sites/default/files/20100407-FTCfiling.pdf(discussing in detail
the complexity of the online advertising ecosystem).
108
theDataMap, (2013), http://thedatamap.org/maps.html.
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privacy in public by multiplying the instances of conformity to norms that have lost their valueoptimality. This is excellent reason to seek replacement norms with better privacy tradeoffs for
restaurants, employers, and businesses. But what about Google, OpenTable, HireRight,
Lexis/Nexis, and information aggregators generally? Are there informational norms relevant to
assessing their activities? In some cases; in others, technology-driven business innovation creates
activities that are not governed by any relevant informational norms at all. We consider one loss
of value-optimality example now and turn to the “no norms” cases next.
We take the facts from Dwyer v. American Express.109 American Express analyzed the
purchases of its cardholders to divide them into
six tiers based on spending habits and then rent this information to participating
merchants as part of a targeted joint-marketing and sales program. For example, a
cardholder may be characterized as “Rodeo Drive Chic” or “Value Oriented.” In order to
characterize its cardholders, [American Express] analyze[s] where they shop and how
much they spend, and also consider behavioral characteristics and spending histories . . .
The merchants using the defendants' service can also target shoppers in categories such as
mail-order apparel buyers, home-improvement shoppers, electronics shoppers, luxury
lodgers, card members with children, skiers, frequent business travelers, resort users,
Asian/European travelers, luxury European car owners, or recent movers.110
Dwyer sued—unsuccessfully—for the invasion of his privacy. Our concern, however, is with
norms, not laws. Does American Express violate a relevant role-appropriate informational norm?
Or does it act role-appropriately? It is, within limits, role appropriate for a business to process
information to maintain and improve the business, and, within limits, it is unobjectionable for a
business to sell a by-product generated in the course of its other business activities. It is
unobjectionable for bakers to sell the by-product of breadcrumbs to pie makers, for example. In
this case, however, the by-product consists of consumer profiles sold to direct marketers. Is that
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role appropriate? The constraints on distribution are sufficiently indeterminate that the answer is
at the very least unclear. The pattern is the same as before.
(1) Businesses treat the practice as role appropriate. Businesses largely take it for
granted that a standard part of their business model consists of processing customer data both for
internal use and, depending on the business model, for distribution to third parties. In a report
revealingly entitled, The New Rules Of The Road: Marketing Data Governance In The Era Of
“Big Data,” the Winterberry Group advises that “[e]levating the role of marketing data—
especially in organizations that have been driven by the “brand” and other factors that were once
considered largely independent from its influence—will substantially affect how enterprises
invest in tools, talent, internal processes and other resources that are core to their customer
interaction effort.”111 Indeed, “[t]he past fifteen years have seen extensive investments in
business infrastructure, which have improved the ability to collect data throughout the enterprise.
Virtually every aspect of business is now open to data collection and often even instrumented for
data collection.”112 The distribution of data for direct marketing is only a small part of the
picture. “[V]endors from whales like IBM and HP to pure-plays like Vertica and Cloudera are
bringing in significant revenue today helping enterprises, governments and healthcare
organizations process and make sense of the torrents of unstructured data flowing from mobile
devices, sensors, social media and other sources.”113
The remaining three parts of the pattern parallel the earlier examples. (2) Consumers
object to the loss of privacy. Consumers’ privacy objections and concerns about direct marketing
111
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are well documented.114 (3) They nonetheless conform to the norm as newly interpreted by
businesses. Not doing so would mean not dealing with an extremely wide range of business and
not using forms of electronic payment. (4) The norm so interpreted is not value-optimal. A norm
that gave consumers more control over their data would be a better justified alternative.

D. Two Ways to “Play Without a Helmet”
As the discussion in this section illustrates, technology-driven business practices occupy
the indeterminate regions of norm-drawn boundaries in ways that massively expand the
collection, use, and distribution of information. The result is that a variety of informational
norms involved are no longer value-optimal and now promote behavior that undermines privacy
in public instead of creating it. Consumers do not resist the transformation even though it puts
the realization of multifaceted selves at risk. Like the pre-1979 hockey players, they remain
trapped in the norms: they “play privacy without a helmet.” They still coordinate with businesses
but in ways that undermine the privacy they need. This degraded cooperation is not the only way
to “play privacy without a helmet.” Another way is to engage in commercial transactions that are
not governed by relevant norms at all. In this case, the helmet has not disappeared; it never
existed in the first place.
Advances in information processing combined with new business models have created a
wide range of situations that are not governed by relevant informational norms. To see how this
happens, consider what is required for an informational norm to exist. There must be a shared
concept of role-appropriate information processing. The concept serves as the focal point around
which consumers and businesses coordinate with regard to information processing. Shared
conceptions of role-appropriateness evolve over time through patterns of social and commercial
114
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interaction, and the process is considerably slower than the rapid proliferation of innovative
commercial interactions driven by the rise of the Internet and advances in information processing
technology.
There are significant similarities between the “no norms” cases and the loss of valueoptimality in existing norms. Both exhibit a similar four-part pattern, and the result is the same in
each case: massive collection, use, and distribution erode privacy in public. In light of these
similarities, our discussion can be brief, even though the lack of norms is equally important as
the loss of value-optimality.

V.

THE EROSION OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC: LACK OF NORMS
We confine our discussion to a consideration of a single example: Facebook.115 It

collects a massive amount of information from its users through their activities on Facebook as
well as other sites. It uses the information to allocate costs and benefits. Facebook uses the
information primarily for advertising purposes, so the costs it distributes include the costs of
receiving possibly unwanted advertising as well as all the costs of having your information in the
hands of another. The benefits that the advertising-supported Facebook allocates consist of all
the benefits of using the site plus the benefit of receiving possibly relevant advertising. Facebook
does not distribute the advertising profiles it creates of its users to third parties; it requires the
advertisers to describe the type of customers they wish to reach, and it arranges the delivery of
the advertisements. Facebook does, however, serve as a conduit to distribute massive amounts of
information. Users distribute the information they post to anyone who is able to search for it,
including potential employers and government agencies, and third party apps distribute
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information. A detailed analysis of each of these three aspects of Facebook would certainly be
interesting, but it is not necessary here.

A. No Shared Conception of Role Appropriateness
There no relevant shared conception of role-appropriate information processing for
Facebook. This is clear from the constant controversy surrounding Facebook’s privacy
practices.116 If Facebook and its users shared a conception of the approximate boundaries of
permissible data collection, use, and distribution, controversy would be minimal. Instead,
Facebook’s practices have sparked controversy from the very beginning.
Controversies about privacy characterize lack of norms situations. The root cause is
business’s enthusiastic embrace of information processing. “The past fifteen years have seen
extensive investments in business infrastructure, which have improved the ability to collect data
throughout the enterprise. Virtually every aspect of business is now open to data collection and
often even instrumented for data collection.”117 Businesses do not invest merely to improve
existing business practices, they also invest in novel forms of commercial interaction based on
innovative uses of information, Facebook being one of many examples. The innovations
typically outrun the relatively slow evolution of social norms and give rise to situations
characterized by the lack of any relevant shared conception of role-appropriate information
processing, a sure sign of the lack of relevant informational norms.
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B. A Similar Four-Part Pattern
The lack of norms cases exhibit a pattern similar to the loss of value-optimality cases.
(1) Facebook defends its practices as appropriate. In December 2009, Facebook
changed the default privacy settings from “private” to “everyone,” a setting that made status
updates and shared content publicly accessible. Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg defended
the change by claiming that “[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more
information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social norm is just
something that has evolved over time.”118 In a conference call with reporters to explain and
defend the change, Facebook’s then CEO, Sheryl Sandberg, sounded the same “evolution”
theme: “by talking in sweeping terms about Facebook's ambitions to lead ‘an evolution from the
information Web to the social Web,’ in which the company has ‘made it safe’ for people to ‘have
their real identity online.’”119 Facebook offered a similar “really in users’ interest” defense of its
2011 partnership with Datalogix.120 To increase the effectiveness of Facebook advertisements,
Datalogix correlates users’ responses to the advertisements while on Facebook with their brickand-mortar purchases.121 Facebook describes the practice as “win-win”: “Advertising helps keep
Facebook free. We believe we can create value for the people who use our services every day by
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offering relevant ads that also incorporate industry-leading privacy protections. In our view, this
is a win-win situation for marketers and for you.”122
Facebook took the same “really in users’ interest” approach to “sponsored stories,”
launched in 2011. A “sponsored story” is an advertisement that indicates that a Facebook user
“likes” (in the Facebook sense) an advertised item or has “checked-in” (in the Facebook sense)
to announce his or her presence on the premises of an advertised business.123 The effect was to
make it appear that the user had actually endorsed (“sponsored”) the business or product.
Facebook initially defended sponsored advertisements as a way to serve users’ interests:
Imagine that you are driving down the freeway and you see a billboard for the latest
Pirates of the Caribbean movie. Then you notice your friend's face is emblazoned across
the billboard as well, with their opinion of the movie, "I thought Johnny Depp was better
than ever!" highlighted for you to see! The creators of the billboard know that YOU
would be most interested in seeing your OWN friend's opinion of the film, not the opinion
of a critic or a stranger. So the billboard intuitively showed you the most influential
message possible. Sponsored stories are essentially the same thing, on a much smaller
scale.124
Facebook announced that it will stop its use of sponsored stories in April 2014: “marketers will
no longer be able to purchase sponsored stories separately.” 125 Users will still be associated with
advertisements, however, because “social context—stories about social actions your friends have
taken, such as liking a page or checking in to a restaurant—is now eligible to appear next to all
ads shown to friends on Facebook.”126 The official rationale is “to simplify Facebook ads,

122

Facebook, RELEVANT ADS THAT PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY (2012),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-and-privacy/relevant-ads-that-protect-yourprivacy/457827624267125.
123
See Understanding Facebook’s Sponsored Stories, FACEBOOK (2011),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/hyperarts-web-design/understanding-facebooks-sponsoredstories/10150320031255844.
124
Id.(emphasis added).
125
An Update to Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK (2014), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-andprivacy/an-update-to-facebook-ads/643198592396693.
126
Id.
47

Self, Privacy, and Power

including eliminating different types of ads that had the same purpose and making our ads look
more consistent.”127
(2) Consumers object to Facebook’s data collection and use practices. As we noted
earlier, Facebook’s practices have been controversial from the beginning, and remain so.128
(3) They nonetheless continue to conform to Facebook’s data collection. Privacy
concerns have not kept users away from Facebook. Facebook has grown from one million
monthly active users in 2004 to 1.5 billion in 2013; it posted its first annual profit of $35 million
in 2009 and has increased dramatically in profitability since then.129 As one commentator
remarked, “Facebook basically knows enough about me to successfully predict what I’m going
to wear tomorrow, yet we all grudgingly accept Zuckerberg’s evil empire and go on with our
status updates.”130 Facebook does allow users to adjust their privacy settings, but that option does
not provide a viable way for users to avoid going along with Facebook’s data collection and use
practices. The settings provide very little control over how Facebook collects and uses data.131
Instead, the settings allow users to control access by other Facebook users.
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Even that degree of control is difficult to exercise. The controls are notoriously
complicated,132 and only a relatively small percentage of users change their settings from
Facebook’s default settings, which maximize public access. 133 In addition, changing the settings
to reflect your privacy preferences is quite difficult. In a Columbia University experiment, none
of the 65 participants were able to set their privacy settings in the way they intended.134 The
participants were Columbia University students. If students at a world class university cannot
successfully adjust their Facebook settings, who can?
(4) It is not consistent with their values. The privacy controversies that show there is no
shared conception of role appropriateness also establish that Facebook’s privacy practices do not
accord with its users’ values. This is hardly a surprise. The explanation is the same as in the
earlier examples. Users desire more control, control that is essential to realizing a multifaceted
self.

C. What Is To Be Done?
The situation is dire. A pervasive and increasing lack of relevant norms governing novel
transactions compounds the privacy-undermining effect of norms that are no longer valueoptimal.
132
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Ever-emerging technological possibilities and the ingenuity of planners generate a steady
stream of new ways of creating, capturing, and using personal data for one institutional
purpose or another. And these innovations, planned or accomplished, pose one challenge
after another to the privacy-protecting Davids, who mobilize thinly stretched resources
against organizational Goliaths. Off the record, privacy defenders confess to worries
about the long-term prospects for their cause. The problem, they say, is not that their
efforts may fail, though inevitably this is often true. Perhaps more disturbing is the fact
that even the most notable victories often appear as provisional non-defeats-subject to
rude reversal down the road . . . Then there is the pervasive sense, widely shared among
privacy-watchers, that public opinion is growing complaisant or even fatalistic
concerning privacy invasion.135
What is to be done?
What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement was Vladimir Lenin’s 1902
call to revolution.136 We also issue a call to a revolution. It is essential to act now to reverse the
erosion of norm-implemented privacy in public by creating value-optimal role-appropriate
informational norms and thereby safeguard the realization of multifaceted selves. This is a
critical time. If nothing is done, peoples will eventually become habituated to what now appear
as privacy invasions. Informational norms will evolve that permit what now appear to be massive
invasions of privacy, and people will embrace those norms as value-optimal because the process
of habituation will have changed their values. Now is the time to reverse this trend. Doing so
requires a sound analysis of what has gone wrong, and we hope we have provided that in our
analysis of informational norms and so hope for a better outcome than the deplorable outcome
Lenin achieved with his seriously flawed analysis. History will judge:
History will record what we, here in the early decades of the information age, did to
foster freedom, liberty, and democracy. Did we build information technologies that
protected people’s freedoms even during times when society tried to subvert them? Or
did we build technologies that could easily be modified to watch and control?137
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We have posed norm-generation strategies elsewhere.138 We conclude by describing a serious
hurdle any attempt to generate norm will confront.

VI.

IS IT ALL OVER?
Attempts to create informational norms can face a Tragedy of the Commons situation in

which the needed norm is not sustainable. We illustrate the problem with a fictionalized version
of the 1884 introduction of the Eastman Kodak “snap camera.” We then consider how to avoid
the Tragedy of the Commons.

A. A Tragedy of the Commons
The snap camera was a startling innovation. Photography was a mid-nineteenth century
invention, but, prior to the snap camera, cameras were quite large and required expertise to use.
Portraits were expensive and required posing motionlessly for three to six seconds. The snap
camera was cheap, portable, and required neither expertise nor pose time. Candid photos became
possible, and that created a privacy problem. The "Hartford Courant" sounded the alarm: "the
sedate citizen can't indulge in any hilariousness without the risk of being caught in the act and
having his photograph passed around among his Sunday School children."139 The camera was
nonetheless hugely popular (especially at the 1889 World Fair, where their users were called
“Kodak fiends”). This is the kind of situation for which coordination-facilitating informational
138
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norms provide a solution. Photographers need the cooperation of the people they photograph,
who must not run away, hide, make (unwanted) faces, or attack the photographer. The people in
turn need the photographers’ cooperation. Photographers should not take pictures or distribute
them in ways that are too invasive of personal lives or too disruptive of the activities
photographed. A role-appropriate informational norm would implement a regime of selective
disclosure that allowed the taking of some pictures while prohibiting others. A variety of norms
corresponding to different roles (private individual, journalist, photographic artist, etc.) would be
required.
It would interesting to study the development of norms governing the taking of candid
photos in public, but our purposes are better served at this point by turning to fiction. Our fiction
is that, at some point after the introduction of the snap camera, someone—Kodak, a group or
privacy advocates, or the government—proposed a role-appropriate informational norm that
everyone agreed was value-optimal. We ignore the likely need for a number of norms, and focus
on the single proposed norm (which is really just a stand-in for any norm that might develop).
Our argument is both conditional and general: No matter what norm is proposed and accepted as
value-optimal, people will not conform to it. They will not, that is, given one plausible
assumption.
The assumption is that those subject to the norm are, in a certain sense, self-interested. In
this case, a classic Tragedy of the Commons140 arises. For those unfamiliar with the Tragedy of
the Commons, we sketch out what happens. Consider Phoebe. Phoebe is self-interested in this
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sense: she prefers that all others conform to the norm while she does not. That way she gets the
benefits of the value-optimal tradeoff while still being able to take and share pictures whenever
and however she wants. More precisely, Phoebe has the following preferences in the following
order. She prefers: (1) not to conform when most do; (2) conform when most conform (so she
constrains her picture taking but contributes to the value-optimal tradeoff); (3) not conform when
most also do not (she does as she pleases, but so does everyone else, and there is no valueoptimal tradeoff); (4) conform when most do not (she constrains her behavior for no gain). What
will she do? She will not conform. She will reason this way. “One of two things will happen:
most will conform, or most will not. If most conform, then I should not. I get what I most want,
and get the benefits of the value-optimal tradeoff. If most do not conform, then I should not.
There is no point in my not taking and sharing pictures as I want when not doing so will not
contribute realizing the value-optimal tradeoff.” If most people are self-interested in the same
way, they will all reason in the same way, and it will be impossible to realize the desired norm.
The same reasoning applies when the actor is not an individual but, for example, a profitmotive driven business and the choice is between conforming to a norm and increasing profits by
information processing. Suppose the business is self-interested in the sense of having these
preferences in this order. It prefers: (1) not to conform when most do (it maximizes profits and
gets the benefits of the value-optimal tradeoff); (2) conform when most conform (it gets benefits
of the tradeoff while not being constrained in ways others are not); (3) not conform when most
also do not (it opts for the profit maximizing strategy buts so does every other business, and there
is no value-optimal tradeoff); (4) conform when most do not (it would reduce profits without a
value-optimal tradeoff). Any business with these preferences will not conform to a proposed
value-optimal norm. That does not bode well for the creation of informational norms.
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The only way to avoid such Tragedy of the Commons situations is to change the actors’
preferences. There are two ways to do this. One is legal regulation that penalizes non-conformity
so heavily (with fines, for example) and with such certainty that non-conformity is no longer a
profit-maximizing strategy. This may be necessary, but it is an unattractive option. Effectively
regulating business behavior in this way is uncertain, difficult, and expensive. An alternative is
to change actors’ commitments so that the first preference is to conform when most others
conform. The suggestion is no pipedream. Commitments to ideals can and do make people
devote themselves to the welfare of others in ways they never would without the commitments.
Examples include public interest lawyers, university professors devoted to teaching, reassuring
surgical nurses, helpful strangers, and devoted parents. They might advance their careers more
successfully with more attention to profitability and less to their ideals, but it is the commitment
to ideals that explains their behavior.

B. Values
Values can make people devote themselves to the welfare of others in ways they never
would without the commitments. Public interest lawyers, university professors devoted to
teaching, reassuring surgical nurses, helpful strangers, and devoted parents might advance their
careers more successfully with more attention to profitability and less to their values, but it is the
values that explain their behavior. Suppose people value coordinating with others to realize
value-optimal privacy tradeoffs, and suppose they value that enough that “conform when others
conform” is their first place preference. That is, given a choice between “conform when most
others do to realize a value-optimal tradeoff” and “not conform when most others do,” they will
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choose to conform. They will, that is, as long as, and only as long as, they believe most others
will do so as well. Their conformity is conditional on their believing others will conform.
Conformity is conditional upon realizing society-wide privacy tradeoffs because realizing
such tradeoffs is like entering elevators. In elevators, there is no point in being a “nearest
neighbor distance maximizer” unless most others are. Similarly, since you need the cooperation
of others to realize society-wide privacy tradeoffs, there is no point in trying to do so unilaterally.
You may still act in a privacy-respecting way even when others do not, but you are not thereby
trying to realize a society-wide value-optimal privacy tradeoff. You know that to be impossible.
You are just doing what your own values require you to do. The conditional nature of conformity
has an importance consequence. It means valuing coordinating with others to realize valueoptimal privacy tradeoffs is by itself not enough to ensure the coordination. People also have to
trust each other to act in accord with their values.

C. The Need for Trust
To see why, suppose Phoebe, like everyone else in her society, values coordinating with
others to realize value-optimal privacy tradeoffs. Phoebe, however, does not think the others will
act in accord with their values. It does not matter why she thinks this, but suppose she has
recently had experiences that give her a dim view of human nature (recently betrayed by friends,
for example). Now suppose the question before Phoebe is whether she should coordinate with
others in a way that will realize a value-optimal privacy tradeoff. Since she will conform
because, and only as long as, most others do, she will not conform.
Creating role-appropriate informational norms requires creating both appropriate values
and sufficient trust that people will act in accord with those values. But isn’t it naïve to think this
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is likely? In many cases, the norms are supposed to constrain business information processing,
and the constraints will compete with the profit motive. The profit motive plays a central role in
market economies. As the noted economist Arthur Okun observes, monetary rewards “provide
the incentives for work effort and productive contribution. In their absence, society would thrash
about for alternative incentives—some unreliable, like altruism; some perilous, like collective
loyalty; some intolerable, like coercion or oppression.”141 Isn’t it naïve to think that businesses
will abide by the constraints? We think not. Profit motive driven businesses operate within a web
of trust:
Society can't function without trust, and our complex, interconnected, and global society
needs a lot of it. We need to be able to trust the people we interact with directly: as we sit
next to them on airplanes, eat the food they serve us in the cabin, and get into their taxis
when we land. We need to be able to trust the organizations and institutions that make
modern society possible: that the airplanes we fly and the cars we ride in are well-made
and well-maintained, that the food we buy is safe and their labels truthful, that the laws in
the places we live and the places we travel will be enforced fairly. We need to be able to
trust all sorts of technological systems: that the ATM network, the phone system, and the
Internet will work wherever we are. We need to be able to trust strangers, singly and in
organizations, all over the world all the time. We also need to be able to trust indirectly;
we need to trust people we don't already know and systems we don't yet understand. We
need to trust trust.142
Is it possible to create the values and trust necessary to establish enough informational
norms to secure sufficient privacy in public? If not, it really is all over.
The realization of multifaceted selves will be sharply constrained, and we—all of us—will begin
to disappear from the scene.

VII.

A WORRIED AFTERTHOUGHT
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We originally ended here, but the following question plagued us to the point that we
added this afterword. Has society already crossed a tipping point with respect to the use of
Google (and Bing, and the other search engines)? What drives our worry is that people do what
is easy, available, and rewarding, and Googling is all three. Enter a few words (on the
smartphone you carry everywhere143) and get informative results. A recent anecdote in New York
magazine illustrates how much things have changed in just one decade:
Ten years ago, on our first date, a woman looked at me with terror when I told her that I
had Googled her and found the designer-shoe company she ran on the side. The look
said: What else do you know? But sometime in the last decade, the practice of furiously
Googling people stopped being creepy and became standard operating procedure.144
If this really is “standard operating procedure,” a tragedy of the commons undermines any
attempt to establish a Google-restrictive informational norm: your first choice will be to Google
others regardless of whether they Google you.
The example concerns individuals, not businesses, but businesses too have access to an
immense variety of information services that are easy, available, and rewarding.145 We worry
that an equally immense variety of tragedies of the commons are unfolding with the result that
privacy by voluntary restraint—voluntary restraint by either individuals or businesses—is
suffering the same fate as privacy by obscurity: shrinking into insignificance. This afterword is
our response. We reiterate our call to reverse the erosion of privacy in public. We hope we are
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not caught in a tragedy of the commons in which we—we multifaceted selves—turn ourselves
into shadows of what we once were. If this is our fate,
The fault . . . is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.146
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